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THE INTERSECTION OF THE TAKINGS 
CLAUSE AND RISING SEA LEVELS: 
JUSTICE O’CONNOR’S CONCURRENCE IN 
PALAZZOLO COULD PREVENT  
CLIMATE CHANGE CHAOS 
DEVON APPLEGATE* 
Abstract: Takings Clause jurisprudence is in a state of disarray. The Supreme 
Court of the United States has not eased the difficult task of determining what 
constitutes an unconstitutional regulatory taking. Although the Supreme Court 
provided some guidance by articulating a three-prong test for determining 
what constitutes such a taking, it failed to define each prong. In a concurring 
opinion in Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, Justice Sandra Day O’Connor defined 
the character of the governmental act prong by emphasizing the importance of 
the purposes served by a governmental act. Justice O’Connor’s approach is 
well suited to handle future environmental regulations aimed at protecting 
coastal regions from rising sea levels. By embracing this approach, the Court 
can reduce the confusion surrounding takings jurisprudence, provide uni-
formity at a critical time, swiftly handle the excess of takings claims that will 
inevitably materialize, and give deferential treatment to important regulations 
that possess strong public purposes.  
INTRODUCTION 
Over the next decade and beyond, global warming and climate change 
will undoubtedly bring important environmental issues before local, state, 
federal, and foreign governments.1 Sea level rise, a well-known effect of 
global warming, has been described as one of the greatest challenges of the 
twenty-first century and has emerged at the forefront of climate change dis-
cussions throughout the world.2 Sea level rise is primarily the result of the 
thermal expansion of oceans and increased temperatures that trigger the 
melting of land glaciers and snow, which subsequently flow into nearby 
                                                                                                                           
 * Managing Editor, BOSTON COLLEGE ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS LAW REVIEW, 2015–2016. 
 1 See Steven J. Eagle, A Prospective Look at Property Rights and Environmental Regulation, 
20 GEO. MASON L. REV. 725, 725, 760 (2013). 
 2 See DOUGLAS CODIGA ET AL., CTR. FOR ISLAND CLIMATE ADAPTATION & POLICY, CLI-
MATE CHANGE AND REGULATORY TAKINGS IN COASTAL HAWAI’I 1 (2011), http://nsgl.gso.uri.
edu/hawau/hawaut11003.pdf [perma.cc/B9ZV-B2VE]; John R. Nolon, Land Use and Climate 
Change: Lawyers Negotiating Above Regulation, 78 BROOK. L. REV. 521, 548 (2013). 
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oceans.3 How to handle rising sea levels in coastal regions is a pressing 
question that dominates these climate change discussions.4 Governments at 
all levels will be expected to create solutions to, and safeguards against, this 
environmental problem.5 In 2008, in light of the widely acknowledged and 
severe consequences of sea level rise, federal and state officials advised 
Congress that coastal regions should receive assistance from the federal 
government to facilitate the planning necessary to cope with the rising sea 
level phenomenon.6 This planning, which is well underway, will result in a 
variety of new environmental regulations.7 
Because these new regulations will inevitably restrict private property 
development, the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Con-
stitution will be implicated and act as an obstacle that the regulations will 
need to overcome.8 Courts, therefore, will be forced to handle and analyze 
these novel, numerous, and essential regulations.9 As it stands today, Tak-
ings Clause jurisprudence lacks both uniformity and clarity.10 The chaotic 
state of takings jurisprudence will become even more chaotic as climate 
change-related regulations emerge, unless the United States Supreme Court 
provides guidance and a clear legal framework through which lower courts 
can evaluate these claims.11 Courts need a clear takings test to apply when 
evaluating takings claims and challenges that will inevitably rise in tandem 
with rising sea levels.12 Although courts have tended to focus their takings 
analysis on the harms effected by a particular regulation, a test suitable for 
the future must also give great weight to the harms avoided by the regula-
tion, or in other words, the purposes served by the regulation.13 
                                                                                                                           
 3 BARBARA J. LAUSCHE, MARINE POLICY INST. AT MOTE MARINE LAB., SYNOPSIS OF AN AS-
SESSMENT: POLICY TOOLS FOR LOCAL ADAPTATION TO SEA LEVEL RISE 5 (2009), https://mote.
org/media/uploads/files/Synopsis-Policy_Tools_for_Local_Adaptation_to_Sea_Level_Rise(fin).pdf 
[https://perma.cc/D38R-488H]. 
 4 See Nolon, supra note 2, at 550. 
 5 See Eagle, supra note 1, at 725. 
 6 Robin Kundis Craig, A Public Health Perspective on Sea-Level Rise: Starting Points for 
Climate Change Adaptation, 15 WIDENER L. REV. 521, 522 (2010). 
 7 See Eagle, supra note 1, at 760. 
 8 See U.S. CONST. amend. V (providing in pertinent part, “nor shall private property be taken 
for public use, without just compensation”); Eagle, supra note 1, at 760. 
 9 See J. Peter Byrne, Rising Seas and Common Law Baselines: A Comment on Regulatory 
Takings Discourse Concerning Climate Change, 11 VT. J. ENVTL. L. 625, 625 (2010); Eagle, 
supra note 1, at 760. 
 10 See First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles 
(First English Evangelical I), 482 U.S. 304, 340 n.17 (1987) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 11 See id.; Eagle, supra note 1, at 760 (discussing complex problems that will be presented to 
courts regarding takings clause challenges arising from climate change). 
 12 See First English Evangelical I, 482 U.S. at 340 n.17 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting the 
lack of a clear takings clause standard); Eagle, supra note 1, at 760 (discussing complex problems 
that will be presented to courts regarding takings clause challenges arising from climate change). 
 13 See infra notes 221–288 and accompanying text. 
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In 2001, in a concurring opinion in Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, Justice 
Sandra Day O’Connor articulated the regulatory takings analysis that should 
be embraced by courts going forward.14 Her concurrence focused on the need 
to examine the purposes served by a regulation.15 Justice O’Connor’s analy-
sis lends itself to giving deferential treatment to important regulations that 
possess strong public purposes.16 Because of the serious dangers associated 
with sea level rise, related regulations will necessitate deferential treat-
ment.17 Regulations related to sea level rise will easily overcome the obsta-
cles posed by the Takings Clause if courts utilize Justice O’Connor’s regu-
latory takings analysis.18 
Part I of this Note describes impending environmental regulations that 
relate to sea level rise to the extent that they have already been proposed or 
developed.19 Part II outlines the historical and current regulatory takings 
jurisprudence. 20  Part III argues that the proper analysis going forward 
should follow Justice O’Connor’s guidance, as articulated in her concurring 
opinion in Palazzolo, because such analysis will allow future environmental 
regulations—in particular those related to climate change—to survive regu-
latory takings challenges, modernize takings law, and create much needed 
uniformity in this area of the law.21 
I. FUTURE ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION 
Sea level rise is an unpredictable phenomenon because scientists are 
still uncertain about the extent of the problem.22 Scientists, for example, 
remain unsure about how abruptly sea levels will rise in response to rapidly 
melting land ice sheets.23 What is certain, however, is that sea level rise is a 
problem that has predictable impacts on human welfare and the environ-
ment.24 In 2007, the Supreme Court in Massachusetts v. Environmental Pro-
tection Agency agreed with this sentiment, acknowledging that rising sea 
                                                                                                                           
 14 See Palazzolo v. Rhode Island (Palazzolo II), 533 U.S. 606, 633−34 (2001) (O’Connor, J., 
concurring). 
 15 Id. 
 16 See id.; infra notes 280–285 and accompanying text. 
 17 See Craig, supra note 6, at 522 (discussing the dangers posed by rising sea levels); infra 
notes 280–285 and accompanying text. 
 18 See Palazzolo II, 533 U.S. at 633−36 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (emphasizing the im-
portance of weighing the public purpose in takings clause analysis); infra notes 280–288 and ac-
companying text. 
 19 See infra notes 22–67 and accompanying text. 
 20 See infra notes 68–220 and accompanying text. 
 21 See infra notes 221–288 and accompanying text. 
 22 See Craig, supra note 6, at 521. 
 23 LAUSCHE, supra note 3, at 5. 
 24 Craig, supra note 6, at 521. 
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levels have already inflicted serious harms on both the environment and 
human welfare.25 Rising sea levels: 
(1) inundate wetlands and lowlands, (2) erode shorelines, (3) ex-
acerbate coastal flooding, (4) increase the salinity of estuaries and 
aquifers and otherwise impair water quality, (5) alter tidal ranges 
in rivers and bays, (6) change the locations where rivers deposit 
sediment, (7) increase the heights of waves, and (8) decrease the 
amount of light reaching the bottoms.26 
Rising sea levels not only erode shorelines, but also displace entire coastal 
communities.27 Erosion magnifies the effects of sea level rise.28 For exam-
ple, if the sea level rises one meter, the amount of land that would disappear 
as a result would actually be much more than one meter as the shoreline 
would simultaneously erode.29 
Shorelines along the East Coast of the United States erode, on average, 
two to three feet per year.30 Shorelines along the U.S. Gulf Coast erode at a 
rate that exceeds four feet per year.31 If the sea level in Bangladesh rises one 
meter, seventeen percent of the country will be inundated.32 Half of the 
Netherlands is at or below sea level.33 The largest cities in both China and 
Nigeria sit less than two meters above sea level.34 Twenty percent of the 
population and farmland in Egypt are situated less than two meters above 
sea level.35 These problems are not merely future contemplations; rising sea 
levels have already devastated a native Alaskan village.36 According to a 
recent study, ten percent of the world lives in low-lying areas that are sus-
                                                                                                                           
 25 Massachusetts v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 549 U.S. 497, 521 (2007). 
 26 Craig, supra note 6, at 522. 
 27 Id. 
 28 Id. 
 29 Id. 
 30 Zane Gresham & Miles Imwalle, Sea Level Rise: Regulatory Responses in San Francisco 
Bay and Across the Globe, TRENDS, Jan.–Feb. 2012, at 2, http://media.mofo.com/files/Uploads/
Images/120131-Gresham-Imwalle-Trends.pdf [perma.cc/755R-2QCB]. 
 31 Id. 
 32 Craig, supra note 6, at 522. 
 33 Gresham & Imwalle, supra note 30, at 2. 
 34 Craig, supra note 6, at 522. 
 35 Id. 
36 Id. at 522–23. The Native Village and City of Kivalina filed suit seeking damages under the 
common law claim of public nuisance. Native Vill. of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., 696 F.3d 
849, 853 (9th Cir. 2012). The plaintiffs claimed that oil, energy, and utility companies released 
excessive amounts of greenhouse gas emissions, which resulted in global warming. Id. According 
to the plaintiffs, global warming has and continues to cause erosion, sea level rise, and the melting 
of ice that protects their village from storms, which are jointly destroying their land. See id. at 
853–54; Gresham & Imwalle, supra note 30, at 2. 
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ceptible to the devastating consequences of sea level rise.37 In the United 
States alone, models predict that a sea level rise of three to five feet could 
displace thirteen and a half million people.38 The regulation of coastlines is 
inevitable and could occur rapidly because the global average rate of sea 
level rise has been accelerating since 1993.39 
There are three distinct approaches taken to combat sea level rise: re-
treat, accommodation, and protection.40 The retreat approach attempts to 
reduce the hazards created by sea level rise by “restricting, prohibiting, or 
removing development” from susceptible areas. 41 Rolling easements and 
setback requirements are both examples of retreat policies.42 The accom-
modation approach aims to decrease the damage to structures caused by 
flooding and storms.43 Examples of accommodation polices include “mini-
mum floor elevations and structural bracing,” which protect against danger-
ous water surges and high-speed winds.44 Protective policies tend to focus 
on protecting “individual buildings and sites,” rather than whole neighbor-
hoods, from “flooding, damage to infrastructure, shore erosion, salinity in-
trusion, and the loss of natural resources.”45 Examples of protective strate-
gies include the building of dunes, “dikes, levees, floodwalls,” or tidal bar-
riers, beach nourishment, and the construction of “wetlands, reefs, or barrier 
islands.”46 Some states have aggressively proposed such strategies, while 
others have failed to develop any strategy at all.47 
Most coastal regions are currently still in the planning stages, but some 
are starting to take regulatory action. 48 For example, in 2008, the State 
Coastal Resources Management Council of Rhode Island added a section in 
its management program entitled “Climate Change and Sea Level Rise to 
                                                                                                                           
 37 Gresham & Imwalle, supra note 30, at 1. 
 38 FLA. DEP’T OF ECON. OPPORTUNITY, HOW COUNTRIES, STATES, AND FLORIDA ADDRESS 
SEA LEVEL RISE: A COMPENDIUM OF CLIMATE CHANGE ADAPTATION RESEARCH 14 (n.d.), https://
content.sierraclub.org/grassrootsnetwork/sites/content.sierraclub.org.activistnetwork/files/teams/doc
uments/CompendiumNationalStateLocalAdaptationProjects.pdf [perma.cc/66XG-8NCA]. 
 39 See LAUSCHE, supra note 3, at 6 (noting average sea level rise has been accelerating since 
1993); Craig, supra note 6, at 526 (noting that the rate of sea level rise appears to be accelerating); 
John R. Nolon, Sea-Level Rise and the Legacy of Lucas: Planning for an Uncertain Future, 66 
PLAN. & ENVTL. L. 4, 4 (2014) (discussing need for public officials to adopt new approaches to 
combat sea level rise). 
 40 Nolon, supra note 2, at 549. 
 41 Id. 
 42 Id. 
 43 Id. 
 44 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 45 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 46 Id. 
 47 Id. at 549–51. 
 48 See Gresham & Imwalle, supra note 30, at 1 (acknowledging that regulatory agencies are 
taking note of rising sea levels and certain legislators are initiating action plans). 
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Rhode Island’s Coastal Management Program” in anticipation of rulemak-
ing.49 Similarly, counties in Maryland have published a series of recom-
mendations in an attempt to protect their lands against sea level rise, such as 
prohibiting new subdivisions, prohibiting the expansion of already devel-
oped lots, restricting major renovations of current structures, and requiring 
the use of perimeter wall and column foundations.50 Recommendations pro-
posed by Delaware include limiting new development in floodplains, pro-
hibiting new lots from being created in floodplains, and requiring new 
structures to be setback adequately from shorelines.51 
In Florida, although the state does not yet require local governments to 
protect against sea level rise, the state provides for the use of a number of 
tools that serve such purposes, including a coastal construction line that re-
quires seaward construction to be subject to additional regulations and a 
coastal setback line, which prohibits “major habitable structures seaward of 
the line.”52 In California, the San Francisco Bay Conservation and Devel-
opment Commission enacted the Bay Plan amendment, which requires 
shoreline projects to anticipate and plan for sea level rise.53 The amendment 
requires regional planning bodies to collaborate with federal, state, and lo-
cal governments to develop an effective plan.54 Taking a different approach, 
New Jersey, as part of its resiliency plan, intends to acquire more than a 
thousand beachfront easements in order to combat sea level rise.55 Along 
the same lines, public beaches in Texas are deemed to be rolling easements 
that move inland with the shorelines.56 South Carolina has taken a similar 
approach.57 
Some states have asserted a clear regulatory approach to combating 
sea level rise.58 North Carolina, for example, requires new structures under 
5000 square feet to be built at a distance from the shore that is at least thirty 
                                                                                                                           
 49 LAND USE LAW CTR., PACE UNIV. SCH. OF LAW, LOCAL LAND USE RESPONSE TO SEA 
LEVEL RISE 16 (n.d.), http://coast.noaa.gov/digitalcoast/_/pdf/Pace_Final_Report.pdf?redirect=301
ocm [perma.cc/VZJ7-3UXW]. 
 50  See ENVTL. RES. MGMT., REGULATORY RESPONSE TO SEA LEVEL RISE AND STORM 
SURGE INUNDATION 13–14 (2011), http://dnr2.maryland.gov/ccs/Publication/Annapolis_RRSLR
nSSI.pdf [perma.cc/C66M-WPK6]. 
 51 Id. at 17. 
 52 LAUSCHE, supra note 3, at 10. 
 53 See S.F. BAY CONSERVATION & DEV. COMM’N, SAN FRANCISCO BAY PLAN 31–39 (2008), 
http://www.bcdc.ca.gov/pdf/bayplan/bayplan.pdf [perma.cc/F5KW-LTLE]; Gresham & Imwalle, 
supra note 30, at 1. 
 54 Gresham & Imwalle, supra note 30, at 1. 
 55 See Exec. Order No. 140, 45 N.J.R. 2289(a) (Oct. 21, 2013); Nolon, supra note 39, at 4. 
 56 See Feinman v. State, 717 S.W.2d 106, 110–11 (Tex. App. 1986) (stating that courts have 
recognized rolling easements for many years and case law approves of the concept of rolling 
easements); Gresham & Imwalle, supra note 30, at 2. 
 57 Gresham & Imwalle, supra note 30, at 2. 
 58 See Nolon, supra note 39, at 4. 
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times the annual erosion rate, which continues to accelerate.59 For larger 
structures, the distance is at least sixty times the annual erosion rate.60 In 
Hawaii, the State Legislature has confirmed that sea level rise causes 
“chronic coastal erosion, coastal flooding, and drainage problems.” 61 To 
combat this problem and regulate coastal development, Hawaii currently 
utilizes shoreline setbacks, which establish the closest distance to the shore-
line that development is permitted. 62  The setbacks address the hazards 
posed by inundation.63 Ultimately, long-term adaption will require new de-
velopment away from areas vulnerable to inundation and erosion, and a 
prohibition on new development in high-risk zones.64 Regulations such as 
these will only become more demanding and intrusive as the sea levels con-
tinue to rise; regulators will be forced to get creative.65 Lawyers and public 
officials are constantly brainstorming new ways to limit development along 
shorelines.66 Regulating shorelines to protect against rising sea levels pre-
sents a daunting problem.67 
II. TAKINGS CLAUSE JURISPRUDENCE 
A. The Takings Clause 
The U.S. government, under the power of eminent domain, is entitled 
to take private property if it has determined that it needs the land for a pub-
lic use that is within its powers.68 The power of eminent domain is, howev-
er, subject to the limitations set forth in the Takings Clause of the Fifth 
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.69 
The Takings Clause protects private property from government usurpa-
tion and use without just compensation.70 Essentially, the Takings Clause 
bars the government from forcing individuals to bear public burdens that 
                                                                                                                           
 59 Gresham & Imwalle, supra note 30, at 2. 
 60 Id. 
 61 CODIGA ET AL., supra note 2, at 3. 
 62 Id. at 11. 
 63 Id. at 10. 
 64 FLA. DEP’T OF ECON. OPPORTUNITY, supra note 38, at 12. 
 65 See Eagle, supra note 1, at 760 (discussing limitations of the current legal framework to 
deal with needed regulation). 
 66 Nolon, supra note 39, at 4. 
 67 See Gresham & Imwalle, supra note 30, at 2 (noting that responding to sea level rise is 
expensive and complex). 
 68 Ann K. Wooster, Annotation, What Constitutes Taking of Property Requiring Compensa-
tion Under Takings Clause of Fifth Amendment to United States Constitution—Supreme Court 
Cases, 10 AM. L. REP. FED. 2D 231, § 5 (2006). 
 69 Id. 
 70 U.S. CONST. amend. V (providing in pertinent part, “nor shall private property be taken for 
public use, without just compensation”); Michael Lewyn, Character Counts: The “Character of 
the Government Action” in Regulatory Takings Actions, 40 SETON HALL L. REV. 597, 597 (2010). 
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should be borne by the public as a whole, thus protecting individuals from 
having to bear more than their share of governmental costs.71 Under the 
Fifth Amendment, just compensation must be paid when a regulatory taking 
is effected.72 
Regulatory takings jurisprudence is notoriously confusing and convo-
luted.73 According to the United States Supreme Court, determining what 
constitutes a taking under the Fifth Amendment has proven to be quite diffi-
cult.74 Critics have described regulatory takings cases as open-ended, not 
well-settled, and lacking standards.75 One critic stated that “[t]he chaotic 
state of taking law makes it especially likely that the availability of the 
damages remedy will induce land-use planning officials to stay well back of 
the invisible line that they dare not cross.”76 The general rule is that proper-
ty may be regulated, but if a regulation goes too far, it constitutes a taking.77 
Nevertheless, the Court has refrained from developing a set formula for de-
termining how far is too far.78 The Court states that the inquiry turns on 
whether justice and fairness require that an individual be compensated for 
injuries caused by a public action.79 Because the Court has not established 
an objective set of rules to assess when a regulation becomes a taking, 
courts must examine the particular circumstances of each case in order to 
decide whether the action at issue is a taking that will be rendered invalid 
by the government’s failure to compensate the private property owners.80 
1. Categorical Regulatory Takings 
There are two types of regulatory takings: total takings and partial tak-
ings.81 Determining if a governmental act is a total regulatory taking, com-
monly referred to as a categorical taking, is much easier than determining if 
                                                                                                                           
 71 Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York (Penn Cent. III), 438 U.S. 104, 123 (1978) 
(quoting Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960)). 
 72 Lewyn, supra note 70, at 597. 
 73 See First English Evangelical I, 482 U.S. 304, 340 n.17 (1987) (Stevens, J., dissenting) 
(noting the chaotic state of takings clause jurisprudence). 
 74 See Penn Cent. III, 438 U.S. at 123. 
 75 See First English Evangelical I, 482 U.S. at 340 n.17 (Stevens, J., dissenting); First English 
Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles (First English Evangelical 
II), 210 Cal. App. 3d 1353, 1361 (1989). 
 76 First English Evangelical I, 482 U.S. at 340 n.17 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Corwin 
W. Johnson, Compensation for Invalid Land-Use Regulations, 15 GA. L. REV. 559, 594 (1981)). 
 77 Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922). 
 78 See Penn Cent. III, 438 U.S. at 124 (stating that the court has not determined a formula for 
what justice and fairness require in takings jurisprudence). 
 79 Id. 
 80 Id. 
 81 Christopher T. Goodin, The Role and Content of the Character of the Governmental Action 
Factor in a Partial Regulatory Takings Analysis, 29 U. HAW. L. REV. 437, 437 (2007). 
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an act constitutes a partial regulatory taking.82 A total regulatory taking is 
often defined as an act that strips the property of all economic value and all 
economically practical uses.83 In cases involving total regulatory takings, 
the court employs a per se rule awarding just compensation.84 In such cases, 
courts need not inquire into any additional considerations.85 
In 2014, the United States Court of Federal Claims in Lost Tree Village 
Corp. v. United States held that a total taking occurred where the U.S. Army 
Corps of Engineers denied a land developer’s wetland fill permit for the 
development of a single-family residential home on island land.86 The court 
reasoned that the property retained no economically beneficial use without 
the permit as the diminution in value of the land was more than ninety-nine 
percent of its total value.87 
In additional to situations where a property loses all economic value, 
the Supreme Court has consistently held that the permanent physical occu-
pation of property constitutes a categorical taking that requires just compen-
sation.88 In 1962, the Supreme Court in Griggs v. Allegheny County, Penn-
sylvania held that where a home, located at the end of the runway, was un-
livable due to airport noise resulting from aircrafts taking off, a physical 
invasion constituting a taking had occurred.89 Courts have also held that 
where highway route barriers cause an unreasonable and permanent inter-
ference with access, a physical invasion that amounts to an unconstitutional 
regulatory taking has occurred.90 
                                                                                                                           
 82 See id. (noting that courts employ a per se rule when evaluating total takings, but that an ad 
hoc approach is required for partial takings). 
 83 See Am. Pelagic Fishing Co. v. United States, 379 F.3d 1363, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (quot-
ing Palm Beach Isles Assocs. v. United States, 231 F.3d 1354, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2000)). 
 84 Goodin, supra note 81, at 437. 
 85 See Am. Pelagic, 379 F.3d at 1372 (noting that the court does not have to consider addi-
tional items, such as investment-backed expectations in total takings cases). Although courts de-
fine investment-backed expectations differently, courts regularly find that an act interferes with a 
party’s investment-backed expectations if it destroys or substantially hinders the party’s ability to 
use its land for a specific and clearly anticipated purpose. See R.S. Radford & J. David Breemer, 
Great Expectations: Will Palazzolo v. Rhode Island Clarify the Murky Doctrine of Investment-
Backed Expectations in Regulatory Takings Law?, 9 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 449, 456 (2001). 
 86 See 115 Fed. Cl. 219, 228, 231 (2014). 
 87 Id. at 231. 
 88 See Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 432 (1982). A physical 
invasion is an act “of such unique character that it is a taking without regard to other factors.” Id. 
 89 369 U.S. 84, 87, 90 (1962). 
 90 Stein v. City of Philadelphia, 557 A.2d 1137, 1130–40 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1989); see Com-
monwealth v. Appointment of Viewers to Assess Damages to Prop. of Roland A. McCrady, 160 
A.2d 715, 720–21 (Pa. 1960); Commerce Land Corp. v. Dep’t of Transp., 361 A.2d 469, 470–71 
(Pa. Commw. Ct. 1976). 
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2. Partial Regulatory Takings 
When there is no categorical taking, but a regulation partially restricts 
use of a property, a partial regulatory taking may have occurred.91 Unlike 
with total regulatory takings, courts do not employ a per se rule with respect 
to partial takings.92 There is no set formula that the Supreme Court uses in 
determining when “justice and fairness” require the government to compen-
sate for harms caused by a public action.93 The Supreme Court frequently 
states that this analysis is done on an ad hoc basis and depends largely on 
the circumstances of each case.94 
The Supreme Court has identified a number of factors, also referred to 
as the Penn Central factors, which play a critical role in this analysis.95 The 
three major factors identified by the Court are the economic impact of the 
regulation on the claimant, the extent that the regulation has affected the 
claimant’s investment-backed expectations, and the character of the gov-
ernmental action (the “Character Prong”).96 Put more simply, courts weigh 
the character of the government action against its effects on private property 
rights.97 The meaning attributed to the Character Prong has been and re-
mains unclear.98 In 1978, in Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New 
York, the Supreme Court attempted to define this prong by stating that a 
taking is more readily “found when the interference with property can be 
characterized as a physical invasion by government . . . [rather] than when 
interference arises from some public program adjusting the benefits and bur-
dens of economic life to promote the common good.”99 The Supreme Court 
views the three-prong regulatory takings test set out in Penn Central, which 
embodies the aforementioned factors, as the “default rule,” but it does not 
provide lower courts with much guidance on how to perform the test.100 
                                                                                                                           
 91 Goodin, supra note 81, at 437. 
 92 Id. 
 93 Penn Cent. III, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978) (citing Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 
594 (1962)). 
 94 Id.; see also United States v. Cent. Eureka Mining Co., 357 U.S. 155, 168 (1958); United 
States v. Caltex (Phil.), Inc., 344 U.S. 149, 156 (1952). 
 95 See Penn Cent. III, 438 U.S. at 124. 
 96 See id. 
 97 Goodin, supra note 81, at 437. 
 98 See id. at 437–38 (noting the multitude of considerations the Court has attached to the 
Character Prong). 
 99 438 U.S. at 124. 
 100 See Goodin, supra 81, at 438 n.12 (characterizing Penn Central as the default rule); 
Lewyn, supra note 70, at 599 (noting the Penn Central test gives judges little guidance). 
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B. Overview of Penn Central 
In 1965, New York City (the “City”) adopted its Landmarks Preserva-
tion Law (the “Law”).101 The Supreme Court in Penn Central evaluated 
whether the Law constituted a regulatory taking requiring just compensa-
tion.102 Similar to many urban landmark laws, instead of requiring the City 
to acquire historic properties, it encouraged private owners and users to pre-
serve the properties.103 The Law involved public entities in land-use deci-
sions affecting historic properties and provided services, standards, controls, 
and incentives for participants.104 The Landmarks Preservation Commission 
(the “Commission”) was responsible for administering the Law and choos-
ing which properties were to be regulated under the Law.105 After being des-
ignated as a landmark, a property became subject to restrictions that limited 
the use of the site.106 The Law required property owners to maintain the ex-
terior of their buildings, keeping these features “in good repair” to assure 
that the Law’s objectives were being upheld and advanced.107 In addition to 
the aforementioned duties, the Commission was required to review and ap-
prove or reject proposals from owners desiring to alter the exterior features 
of the landmark or construct any exterior additions.108 
In 1967, New York’s Grand Central Terminal (the “Terminal”) became 
regulated under the Law.109 In 1968, Penn Central Transportation Company 
(“Penn Central”), the owner of Grand Central Terminal, contracted with a 
corporation to construct an office building above the Terminal.110 Penn Cen-
tral then applied for a permit to construct the office building from the 
Commission by submitting two alternative plans.111 The Commission de-
nied both proposals submitted on behalf of Penn Central.112 Penn Central 
then filed suit claiming that the government, under the Law, had taken their 
property without just compensation.113 The Appellate Division of the New 
York Supreme Court found that the restrictions placed on the Terminal were 
necessary to promote the Law’s public purpose of protecting landmarks.114 
                                                                                                                           
 101 N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE, ch. 8–A, § 205-1.0 (1976); Penn Cent. III, 438 U.S. at 108−09. 
 102 438 U.S. at 107. 
 103 Id. at 109−10. 
 104 Id. 
 105 Id. at 110. 
 106 Id. at 111. 
 107 Id. at 111−12. 
 108 Id. at 112. 
 109 Id. at 115−16. 
 110 Id. at 116. 
 111 Id. 
 112 Id. at 117. 
 113 Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York (Penn Cent. I), 50 A.D.2d 265, 271 (N.Y. 
App. Div. 1975). 
 114 Id. at 272. 
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The Court held that Penn Central could only sustain its claim by establish-
ing that the Law deprived the property of all its beneficial uses.115 Subse-
quently, the New York Court of Appeals affirmed this holding.116 Penn Cen-
tral appealed the verdict again and the United States Supreme Court re-
viewed the case to determine whether the restrictions imposed by the Law 
on the Terminal constituted a taking without just compensation.117 
Despite acknowledging the Law’s proper public purpose, the appel-
lants in Penn Central contended that the regulation constituted a taking 
without just compensation. 118 The appellants challenged the Law on the 
grounds that it had taken their property and arbitrarily deprived them of 
their property without due process of law, which violated the Fifth and 
Fourteenth Amendments. 119  The appellants advanced a number of argu-
ments explaining why the Law constituted a taking.120 First, the appellants 
contended that the Law deprived them of any beneficial use of the air rights 
above the terminal and thus, they deserved just compensation according to 
the value of the air rights.121 Second, the appellants asserted that the Law 
constituted a taking because it substantially reduced the value of their prop-
erty.122 Appellants also argued that the Law inherently failed to distribute 
the benefits and burdens associated with zoning laws and historic district 
legislation.123 Lastly, the appellants asserted that the Law was arbitrary or at 
least subjective because it was simply based on the City’s “taste” and that 
Penn Central was exclusively burdened under the Law.124 
The Supreme Court found that the Law did not constitute a categorical 
taking because it did not deprive the appellants of all beneficial uses of their 
air rights.125 The Court’s inquiry, however, did not end there.126 The Court 
                                                                                                                           
 115 Id. at 274. 
 116 Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York (Penn Cent. II), 366 N.E.2d 1271, 1279 (N.Y. 
1977). 
 117 Penn Cent. III, 438 U.S. at 107. 
 118 See id. at 119, 129 (noting that Penn Central recognized a legitimate government interest 
in the law, but challenged it as a taking without compensation anyway). The plaintiffs stated that 
the objective of preserving historic, architectural, and cultural structures and areas was a wholly legit-
imate governmental purpose. Id. at 129. The City believed that its position, as a global tourist center, 
cultural hub, and business capital would be endangered if the Landmarks Preservation Law was not 
enforced. Id. at 109. According to the City, the Law fostered “civic pride in the beauty and noble 
accomplishments of the past,” protected and enhanced the city’s attractions, supported and stimulated 
business, strengthened the economy, and encouraged people to use the landmarks for educational, 
pleasure and welfare purposes. Id. 
 119 Id. at 119. 
 120 Id. at 128−29. 
 121 Id. at 130. 
 122 Id. at 131. 
 123 Id. at 133. 
 124 Id. at 132, 134. 
 125 Id. at 130−31. 
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needed to determine whether the Law constituted a partial regulatory taking 
that required compensation.127 In making this determination, the Court evalu-
ated the extent to which the regulation interfered with petitioner’s rights in 
the Terminal and emphasized that courts have, on occasion, upheld land-use 
regulations that have destroyed individual property interests where “health, 
safety, morals, or general welfare” are promoted.128 
The Court issued a number of holdings.129 The Court found that the 
Law did not interfere with Penn Central’s present uses of the Terminal and 
that the record lacked evidence demonstrating that the Law limited Penn 
Central’s investment-backed expectations.130 The Court stated that because 
Penn Central had not submitted a proposal for the construction of a smaller 
structure, the Court did not know if appellants would be denied all uses of 
the air space above the Terminal.131 In addition, according to the Court, the 
Law did not restrict the air space above all parcels of the Terminal.132 The 
Court ultimately held that the Law was not a taking, stating that it promoted 
the general welfare, permitted viable beneficial use of the property, and al-
lowed appellants to develop the Terminal.133 With this opinion, the Court 
established a three-prong test to evaluate regulatory takings claims. 134 
Courts must weigh the economic impact of the regulation, the degree of 
interference with investment-backed expectations, and the character of the 
governmental act.135 Unfortunately, the Court failed to elaborate on what 
aspects of the Character Prong are relevant to such determinations, although 
Justice William Rehnquist’s dissent noted it should be the focal point of 
future inquiries.136 
                                                                                                                           
 126 Id. at 135. 
 127 See id. at 135–36 (noting that in addition to rejecting broad arguments, the Court must 
determine whether interference is of such magnitude to require just compensation). 
 128 Id. at 125, 136. 
 129 Id. at 136−38. 
 130 Id. at 136−37. 
 131 Id. at 137. 
 132 Id. The Court found that the appellants could utilize the air space above at least eight par-
cels of the Terminal, one or two of which had already been deemed suitable for construction of 
new buildings. Id. 
 133 Id. at 138. 
 134 See id. at 124 (outlining the three factors considered by the Court). 
 135 Id. 
 136 Id. at 149−50 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). The dissent in Penn Central emphasized that 
courts should focus more on the character of the governmental act and less on the extent of dam-
age resulting from the act, reasoning that it is primarily the character of the invasion that deter-
mines whether or not the act constitutes a taking. Id.; see Alan Romero, Ends and Means in Tak-
ings Law After Lingle v. Chevron, 23 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 333, 361 (2008) (noting that Penn 
Central did not explain what aspects of the character prong are relevant in regulatory takings chal-
lenge analyses). 
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C. Penn Central’s Murky Character Prong 
Muddled, indeterminate, and lacking standards are words commonly 
used to describe the Supreme Court’s regulatory takings jurisprudence.137 
Because the Court has embraced an ad hoc approach to non-categorical 
regulatory takings cases, the relevant analysis is far from straightforward.138 
Penn Central has long been viewed as the landmark regulatory takings case, 
which established the three-prong test for determining when an unconstitu-
tional regulatory taking has occurred so that just compensation is due.139 
Unfortunately, the third factor put forth in Penn Central—the “character of 
the governmental act” —has remained markedly undefined.140 The Supreme 
Court has refrained from attaching any clear meaning to this prong.141 In 
1992, the Supreme Court in Yee v. City of Escondido, California stated that 
the purpose of the government regulation is an essential consideration when 
determining whether a taking has occurred and if compensation is re-
quired.142 The Supreme Court, however, did not specifically state that the 
evaluation of a regulation’s purpose falls under the Character Prong of the 
Penn Central test.143 Penn Central’s Character Prong, “Always listed, only 
occasionally deployed, and left largely undefined” remains a mystery.144 As 
a result, courts interpret this factor in a variety of ways leading to confusion 
and a lack of uniformity in the relevant jurisprudence.145 
                                                                                                                           
 137 Mark W. Cordes, The Fairness Dimension in Takings Jurisprudence, 20 KAN. J. L. & PUB. 
POL’Y 1, 16 (2010); Eagle, supra note 1 at 750; Mark Fenster, The Stubborn Incoherence of Regu-
latory Takings, 28 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 525, 546 (2009). 
 138 See Fenster, supra note 137, at 545−46 (noting that the relevant inquiry is broad and inde-
terminate). Courts that embrace an ad hoc approach evaluate cases on a case-by-case basis and 
look at the circumstances surrounding each case, allowing for a “careful examination and weigh-
ing of all the relevant circumstances.” Palazzolo II, 533 U.S. 606, 636 (2001) (O’Connor, J., con-
curring). 
 139 Timothy J. Dowling, On History, Takings Jurisprudence, and Palazzolo: A Reply to James 
Burling, 30 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 65, 89 (2002). Volume 30 of the Boston College Environ-
mental Affairs Law Review includes articles from the 2002 symposium titled “The Palazzolo 
Wetland Regulation Symposium: A Supreme Court case in Boston College’s Backyard.”  
 140 See Fenster, supra note 137, at 529; Patrick A. Parenteau, Unreasonable Expectations: 
Why Palazzolo Has No Right to Turn a Silk Purse into a Sow’s Ear, 30 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 
101, 130 (2002). 
 141 Fenster, supra note 137, at 529; Lewyn, supra note 70, at 600; Parenteau, supra note 140, 
at 130. 
 142 Yee v. City of Escondido, 503 U.S. 519, 522−23 (1992). 
 143 See id. (absence of discussion of the Character Prong when considering purpose). 
 144 Fenster, supra note 137, at 529. 
 145 See, e.g., Bass Enters. Prod. Co. v. United States, 381 F.3d 1360, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (stat-
ing that based on recent decisions there has been a rejection of earlier pre-Palazzolo precedent and a 
return to the earlier evaluation of the character of the governmental action factor); Loveladies Har-
bor, Inc. v. United States, 28 F.3d 1171, 1179 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (holding that federal courts must 
employ “more familiar and predictable doctrines associated with nuisance laws” in evaluating the 
Character Prong rather than the ad hoc methodology); Leon County v. Gluesenkamp, 873 So. 2d 
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The lack of clarity surrounding the Character Prong significantly con-
tributes to the broader lack of understanding of regulatory takings analy-
sis. 146 Justice O’Connor attempted to clarify the Character Prong in her 
concurring opinion in Palazzolo v. Rhode Island.147 She reasoned that courts 
should weigh the purposes of the statute against the effects it produces.148 
Although it is widely acknowledged that the Supreme Court typically em-
ploys some type of balancing test in the Penn Central analysis, the Court 
has refrained from articulating the weight and meaning that should be at-
tributed to the Character Prong.149 
D. Refining Penn Central in Palazzolo v. Rhode Island 
1. Initial Interpretation by Rhode Island Supreme Court 
In 1959, Anthony Palazzolo purchased three undeveloped neighboring 
parcels of land along the eastern stretch of Atlantic Avenue, which was the 
primary point of access to Misquamicut State Beach.150 In 1971, Rhode Is-
land created the Rhode Island Coastal Resources Management Council (the 
“Council”) in order to protect the State’s coastal properties.151 The Council 
promulgated regulations that substantially limited development on coastal 
wetlands.152 Palazzolo’s property, which was designated as coastal wetlands 
under Rhode Island law, became subject to the Council’s 1971 wetlands 
regulations.153 In an attempt to develop his property, Palazzolo submitted 
multiple proposals to the Council for approval.154 The Council denied all of 
his proposals.155 Palazzolo subsequently brought an action, in Palazzolo v. 
                                                                                                                           
460, 469 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004) (explaining that the analysis of the character of the govern-
ment action requires a weighing of appellees’ interests against the opponent’s need to protect the 
public); K & K Constr., Inc. v. Dep’t of Envtl. Quality, 705 N.W. 2d 365, 384 (Mich. Ct. App. 
2005) (evaluating whether a particular regulation causes plaintiffs to bear a burden for the public 
good and whether the regulation is a “comprehensive, broadly based regulatory scheme that bene-
fits and burdens all citizens relatively equally”). See John D. Echeverria, Making Sense of Penn 
Central, 23 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 171, 186–99 (2005) (listing the Supreme Court’s varying 
interpretations of the Character Prong); Lewyn, supra note 70, at 600 (noting confusion among 
lower courts). 
 146 Echeverria, supra note 145, at 177. 
 147 See Palazzolo II, 533 U.S. 606, 634 (2001) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (discussing the 
Character Prong). 
 148 Id. 
 149 See Fenster, supra note 137, at 528–29 (noting that the Penn Central analysis is a balanc-
ing test with an undefined character prong); Lewyn, supra note 70, at 600 (noting that the Penn 
Central court balanced economic effects, but failed to make it clear what “character” meant). 
 150 Palazzolo II, 533 U.S. at 613. 
 151 Id. at 614. 
 152 Id. 
 153 Id. 
 154 Id. at 614−15. 
 155 Id. 
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Rhode Island, against the Council in the Rhode Island Superior Court as-
serting that the wetlands regulations constituted a taking that required just 
compensation under the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment.156 
 The Superior Court of Rhode Island ruled against Palazzolo and the 
Rhode Island Supreme Court affirmed the holding.157 The Rhode Island Su-
preme Court held that: (1) Palazzolo’s claim was not ripe, (2) the invest-
ment-backed expectation that he could develop a large subdivision on his 
property was unreasonable, and (3) he was not deprived of all beneficial use 
of his property based on the record.158 
Before examining the Penn Central factors to determine if the regulation 
constituted a partial taking, the court first determined that there was no per se 
taking depriving Palazzolo of all beneficial uses of the property. 159  The 
court’s takings analysis, however, consisted merely of stating that Palazzolo 
had no reasonable investment-backed expectations and thus, the court need 
not examine the other Penn Central factors, including the Character Prong.160 
The court ultimately held that the petitioner could not recover under the 
Penn Central test.161 
2. Majority Opinion of the Supreme Court of the United States 
The Supreme Court heard the case after granting a writ of certiorari, 
and found that the Rhode Island Supreme Court blatantly disregarded the 
Penn Central factors.162 Upon review, the Supreme Court agreed that the 
petitioner was not deprived of all economic use of his property, but disa-
greed with the Rhode Island Supreme Court’s other conclusions. 163 Alt-
hough the lower court mentioned the Penn Central factors, the Supreme 
Court stated that the court erred in failing to elaborate upon them and thus 
remanded the case for further consideration of all of the factors.164 
3. Justice O’Connor’s Concurring Opinion 
In her concurrence, Justice O’Connor stressed the importance of the 
Penn Central factors, which the Supreme Court of Rhode Island so blatant-
ly disregarded.165 She described the test’s factors as the principle character-
                                                                                                                           
 156 Id. at 615. 
 157 Palazzolo v. Rhode Island (Palazzolo I), 746 A.2d 707, 707 (R.I. 2000). 
 158 Id. at 717. 
 159 Id. at 713. 
 160 Id. at 717. 
 161 Id. 
 162 Palazzolo II, 533 U.S. 606, 611, 632 (2001). 
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 165 See id. at 632−36 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
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istics that must be examined in regulatory takings cases.166 The Rhode Is-
land Supreme Court found the fact that the appellant lacked reasonable in-
vestment-backed expectations to be dispositive. 167 Justice O’Connor em-
phasized that the second prong of the analysis, the investment-backed ex-
pectations, is just one part of the analysis that must be performed in deter-
mining if a regulation “goes too far.”168 She noted that the Takings Clause 
requires a thorough consideration and weighing of all relevant circumstanc-
es, including the Character Prong.169 
In relevant part, Justice O’Connor stated that Penn Central’s Character 
Prong requires courts to weigh “[t]he purposes served, as well as the effects 
produced . . . .”170 Justice O’Connor noted the importance of the purposes 
of a regulation, not only its effects, in evaluating its character.171 Commen-
tators have noted the significance of this concurrence because it emphasizes 
that courts must carefully consider the purposes furthered by the regulatory 
act and also whether these purposes are effectively furthered.172 
4. Superior Court of Rhode Island 
On remand, the Superior Court of Rhode Island focused on all three 
factors identified in Penn Central.173 The court stated that the regulation, 
which banned certain uses of the property, is a prime example of an act that 
may constitute a partial regulatory taking and where such potential exists, 
the court must apply the fact-based inquiry outlined in Penn Central, which 
includes three principal factors.174 
The Character Prong, which was addressed only briefly in the case’s 
previous opinions, spanned an entire section in this opinion.175 The court 
began its analysis of the Character Prong by establishing that the case was 
neither a physical takings case nor a regulatory takings case where the 
property has been stripped of all economically beneficial use.176 The court 
noted that the plaintiff did not contest the fact that the environmentally 
                                                                                                                           
 166 Id. at 633. 
 167 Id. at 634. 
 168 Id. 
 169 See id. at 636. 
 170 Id. at 634. 
 171 Id.; Romero, supra note 136, at 364. 
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friendly regulation benefited society as a whole.177 The regulated land on 
which Palazzolo’s property sat was a salt marsh, which provided a valuable 
habitat for wildlife.178 According to experts, the deprecation of the natural 
purifying salt marsh would have been substantial if Palazzolo developed his 
property.179 In light of these findings, the court stressed the importance of 
regulations promoting “the health, safety, and welfare of the people.”180 The 
court stated that when these characteristics are present, it militates against 
finding a regulatory taking.181 
The court agreed with the Supreme Court of Rhode Island that the reg-
ulation did not deprive Palazzolo of all economically beneficial uses of the 
property and further held that it did not even substantially impact his prop-
erty in an economically adverse manner.182 The court also established that 
Palazzolo’s reasonable investment-backed expectations were only modest 
for it was an unreasonable expectation for Palazzolo to think he could de-
velop his property as he subsequently proposed.183 Therefore, the court held 
that the petitioner failed to prove that the government committed a regulato-
ry taking necessitating just compensation.184 
E. Subsequent Interpretations of Penn Central’s Character Prong 
Two predominant strands of case law concerning the Penn Central fac-
tors, in particular, the Character Prong, emerged following the decisions in 
Penn Central and Palazzolo.185 Some courts performed a balancing test that 
was in line with the approach articulated by Justice O’Connor in her concur-
rence, by weighing the purpose and harms avoided by a regulation against the 
harms effected by it.186 Other courts took a much different approach by com-
paring each regulation to a physical invasion in an attempt to determine if the 
regulation was similar enough to a physical invasion that it should be deemed 
a regulatory taking.187 Some courts followed neither approach.188 
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1. Examining and Weighing the Purpose of and the Harms Avoided by 
Regulations 
Some courts, without any explicit guidance from the Supreme Court, 
have employed an analysis in line with Justice O’Connor’s Palazzolo bal-
ancing test, which focuses on purpose when evaluating partial regulatory 
takings cases.189 In 1989, even before Justice O’Connor’s concurrence, in 
First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los 
Angeles, California, the California Court of Appeals held that a temporary 
ordinance restricting construction did not constitute a compensable regula-
tory taking.190 In 1957, the First English Evangelical Lutheran Church (the 
“Church”) purchased property spanning twenty-one acres in a canyon that 
ran along the Middle Fork of Mill Creek in the Angeles National Forest.191 
The Middle Fork served as the natural drainage channel for a watershed 
area owned by the National Forest Service.192 In 1977, a forest fire de-
stroyed 3860 acres of the watershed area creating a severe flood hazard for 
the Church’s property.193 A subsequent storm overflowed Mill Creek and 
flooded the Church’s property destroying its buildings.194 In response, the 
County of Los Angeles (the “County”) adopted interim Ordinance No. 
11,855 (the “Ordinance”), which stated that a person shall not construct, 
renovate, or enlarge any building or structure in the interim flood protection 
area.195 The County adopted the ordinance on the grounds that it was neces-
sary for the immediate protection and preservation of the public health and 
safety.196 The Church then filed a complaint against the County and the Los 
Angeles County Flood Control District claiming that the Ordinance denied 
it all use of the property and sought damages for the deprivation.197 The 
Superior Court of California rendered a verdict for the defendant and the 
                                                                                                                           
 189 See Palazzolo II, 533 U.S. 606, 634 (2001) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (noting that courts 
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Church appealed.198 The California Court of Appeals affirmed the holding 
and the Supreme Court of the United States subsequently accepted the ap-
peal.199 The Supreme Court ultimately remanded the case for further pro-
ceedings to determine if a compensable regulatory taking had occurred.200 
Without ever mentioning the Character Prong, the California Court of 
Appeals performed a balancing test and determined that the program did not 
constitute a regulatory taking.201 Without categorizing its analysis under the 
Character Prong, the court emphasized that the Ordinance promoted public 
health and safety.202 The public purpose of preserving lives and health ad-
vanced by the Ordinance was of the utmost importance.203 According to the 
court, it makes “perfect sense” to deny compensation for regulations that 
promote the health, safety, and general welfare, even if all beneficial uses 
are destroyed.204 The court’s reasoning was similar to that of other courts in 
that it recognized that compensation is not required for regulations promot-
ing the health, safety, morals, or general welfare.205 Compensation, howev-
er, will be required for denial of all uses if the governmental act advances 
lesser public purposes.206 Because the Ordinance advanced extremely im-
portant public purposes, compensation was not required.207 
Other courts have similarly weighed the harms avoided by a specific 
regulation against the harms effected in determining if it amounts to a com-
pensable regulatory taking.208 In 2001, the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Federal Circuit held in Rith Energy, Inc. v. United States that the 
revocation of a coal mining permit directed at protecting the safety, health, 
and welfare of the public did not amount to a compensable taking.209 Five 
years later, in 2006, the United States Court of Federals Claims in Brace v. 
United States held that wetlands regulations did not constitute a regulatory 
taking.210 The court stated that in evaluating the character of the govern-
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mental action, the court must consider “the purpose and importance of the 
public interest underlying [the] regulatory imposition” which includes ex-
amining the act’s social value and location.211 The court reasoned that the 
preservation of ecologically significant areas outweighed the effects pro-
duced by the regulation.212 
2. Comparing Regulations to Physical Invasions 
Conversely, courts that have not employed an analysis similar to Jus-
tice O’Connor’s balancing test have looked at the nature of the regulation to 
see if it resembles a physical invasion.213 In 2004, the United States District 
Court for the District of Nevada held in Committee for Reasonable Regula-
tion of Lake Tahoe v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency that the Tahoe Re-
gional Planning Agency’s adoption of a scenic review ordinance that regu-
lated the appearance of residential housing on littoral and shoreline proper-
ties on Lake Tahoe did not constitute a regulatory taking.214 In evaluating 
the Penn Central factors, in particular the Character Prong, the district court 
did not even mention the purpose of the ordinance.215 The court, instead, 
looked generally at the nature of the intrusion and found that it was unlike a 
physical invasion by the government.216 
Similarly, in 2006, the Missouri Court of Appeals found in Reagan v. 
County of St. Louis, Missouri that a county’s rezoning of the plaintiff’s prop-
erty from industrial to residential did not constitute a regulatory taking.217 In 
analyzing Penn Central’s Character Prong, the court stated that the factor 
was favorable to the county because the rezoning was substantially different 
from a physical invasion.218 The court stated in a matter-of-fact fashion that 
because the county “did not physically invade Landowner’s property” but 
merely rezoned it, no taking had occurred.219 Numerous courts continue to 
analyze the Character Prong by determining to what extent the interference 
caused by the regulation can be characterized as a physical invasion.220 
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 220 See, e.g., Paradissiotis v. United States, 49 Fed. Cl. 16, 23 (2001) (noting that the govern-
ment never took physical possession of the property in determining that no taking occurred); Gach 
v. Fairfield Borough, 921 F. Supp. 2d 371, 378 (M.D. Pa. 2013) (finding that the plaintiffs failed 
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III. JUSTICE O’CONNOR’S TEST WILL STREAMLINE AND MODERNIZE 
REGULATORY TAKINGS ANALYSIS JUST IN TIME FOR THE  
FLOOD OF NEW CLIMATE CHANGE REGULATIONS 
Although some courts since Palazzolo v. Rhode Island have employed 
an analysis in line with Justice Sandra Day O’Connor’s method, the United 
States Supreme Court has never addressed, acknowledged, condoned, or 
rejected Justice O’Connor’s approach.221 The only guidance provided by a 
majority opinion of the Supreme Court relating to Penn Central Transporta-
tion Co. v. City of New York’s third consideration, the character of the gov-
ernment action (the “Character Prong”), was articulated in the case itself, 
where the Court suggested that a taking is more readily found when the in-
terference with property can be characterized as a physical invasion.222 This 
physical invasion test should not be the test utilized by courts moving for-
ward.223 This analysis has resulted in a diversity of opinion and lack of uni-
formity in the relevant body of law, and will not stand the test of time.224 
Some courts have already moved away from the original physical invasion 
characterization of the Character Prong and are focusing on examining the 
purposes served by a regulation and weighing its societal benefits against 
the harms it inflicts.225 
Other than the brief description provided in Penn Central, the Supreme 
Court has never articulated the meaning of the Character Prong, despite the 
emerging opinion that the character of the governmental act may be the 
                                                                                                                           
to assert any physical invasion and none of the defendant’s conduct took place on the plaintiffs’ 
property). 
 221 See Rith Energy, Inc. v. United States, 270 F.3d 1347, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (emphasizing 
the importance of the purpose of the regulation in takings analysis); Brace v. United States, 72 
Fed. Cl. 337, 355−56 (2006) (focusing on the importance of the purpose of the underlying regula-
tion in takings analysis); Comm. for Reasonable Regulation of Lake Tahoe v. Tahoe Reg’l Plan-
ning Agency, 311 F. Supp. 2d 972, 997 (D. Nev. 2004) (focusing solely on the physical nature of 
the regulation); Fenster, supra note 137, at 529 (noting that the Character Prong has been left 
largely undefined); Lewyn, supra note 70, at 600 (noting that the Supreme Court has never made 
it clear what character means); Parenteau, supra note 140, at 130 (stating that there is considerable 
debate over the intention of the Penn Central Court’s character prong). 
 222 See Penn Cent. III, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978). 
 223 See supra notes 213−220 and accompanying text. 
 224 Compare Rith Energy, Inc., 270 F.3d at 1352 (emphasizing the importance of the purpose 
of the regulation in takings analysis), with Comm. for Reasonable Regulation of Lake Tahoe, 311 
F. Supp. 2d at 997 (focusing solely on the physical nature of the regulation). Others have noticed 
the same. See Echeverria, supra note 145, at 199 (noting the lack of clarity in takings analysis); 
infra notes 236−273 and accompanying text. 
 225 Compare Penn Cent. III, 438 U.S. at 124 (discussing the Character Prong as a physical 
invasion), with Rith Energy, 270 F.3d at 1352−53 (focusing on the purpose of the regulation), and 
Brace, 72 Fed. Cl. at 355−56 (emphasizing the public welfare served by the regulation). 
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most important factor in takings analysis.226 The Supreme Court routinely 
states that regulatory takings cases are decided on an ad hoc basis, but the 
guidance ends there.227 In her concurring opinion in Palazzolo v. Rhode Is-
land, Justice O’Connor took the initiative to define and clarify the Penn 
Central factors; in particular, she defined the Character Prong.228 Justice 
O’Connor stated that in evaluating the character of the act, courts must look 
at the purpose of the statute, in addition to the effects it produces.229 Accord-
ing to Justice O’Connor, the impact of the governmental act must be viewed 
in light of its purposes.230 Justice O’Connor’s use of the word “purpose” is 
critical in defining Penn Central’s third prong.231 Her approach, which fo-
cuses on examining an act’s purpose, is distinct from the approach used by 
numerous courts, which analyze the Character Prong by comparing the reg-
ulation to a physical intrusion.232 The analysis outlined by Justice O’Connor 
is essentially a balancing of harms: it involves a weighing of an act’s pur-
poses and the harms avoided, against the harms inflicted on the private 
property owner.233 Still, the Supreme Court has never acknowledged that this 
analysis must be done under Penn Central’s Character Prong.234 This clarifi-
cation is critical in order to rationalize regulatory takings jurisprudence.235 
                                                                                                                           
 226 See Fenster, supra note 137, at 529 (noting that the Character Prong has been left largely 
undefined); Lewyn, supra note 70, at 600 (noting that the Supreme Court never made it clear what 
character means); Parenteau, supra note 140, at 130 (stating that there is considerable debate over 
the intention of the Penn Central Court’s Character Prong). Compare Penn Cent. III, 438 U.S. at 
124 (discussing the Character Prong solely in context of a physical invasion), with Penn Cent. III, 
438 U.S. at 149−50 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (stating that the Character Prong is the most im-
portant part of the analysis). 
 227 See, e.g., Palazzolo II, 533 U.S. 606, 633 (2001) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (noting the 
proper analysis still involves an ad hoc inquiry); Penn Cent. III, 438 U.S. at 124 (stating that the 
takings clause analysis is an ad hoc inquiry); Fenster, supra note 137, at 529 (noting that the 
Character Prong has been left largely undefined). 
 228 See 533 U.S. at 633−34 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 229 Id. 
 230 Id. 
 231 Id; Romero, supra note 136, at 364 (noting the importance of Justice O’Connor’s use of 
the word purpose). 
 232 Compare Palazzolo II, 533 U.S. at 633−34 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (emphasizing the 
importance of a regulation’s purpose as it relates to the character), with Comm. for Reasonable 
Regulation of Lake Tahoe v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 311 F. Supp. 2d 972, 997 (D. Nev. 
2004) (analyzing the Character Prong in the context of a physical invasion), and Reagan v. County 
of St. Louis, 211 S.W.3d 104, 110 (Mo. Ct. App. 2006) (analyzing the regulation as a physical 
intrusion). 
 233 See 533 U.S. at 634 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (noting that identifying the public purpose 
of a regulation is an essential inquiry when evaluating takings claims involving private parties). 
 234 See Fenster, supra note 137, at 529 (stating the Character Prong has been left largely unde-
fined); Lewyn, supra note 70, at 600 (noting the Supreme Court never clearly defined what char-
acter means); Parenteau, supra note 140, at 130 (stating that there is considerable debate over the 
intention of the Penn Central Court’s Character Prong). 
 235 See First English Evangelical I, 482 U.S. 304, 340 n.17 (1987) (Stevens, J., dissenting) 
(stating that regulators will be slow to act in the face of uncertain regulatory takings jurispru-
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A. Justice O’Connor’s Test Will Provide Uniformity at a Critical Time 
The holding in Penn Central and its balancing test delegated a consid-
erable amount of discretion to lower courts and as a result, lower courts 
have faced significant challenges.236 When employing the analysis outlined 
in Penn Central, courts must properly weigh the three factors.237 Courts 
must give “proper” weight to each factor for the balancing test to be suc-
cessful.238 Lower courts, therefore, must thoroughly understand the Penn 
Central factors to perform the proper analysis.239 It is clear from the rele-
vant case law that courts are unsure about what meaning to give Penn Cen-
tral’s Character Prong. 240  Justice O’Connor’s concurrence provides this 
clarification and will promote consistency in this area of the law.241 By con-
sistently applying Justice O’Connor’s approach, instead of comparing regula-
tions to physical intrusions, non-categorical regulatory takings cases will be-
come less unsettled and provide more predictability for both private property 
owners and regulators alike.242 
Regulation that affects shoreline property will only grow more common 
with time.243 As these regulations become more common, property owners 
will be more motivated to bring takings claims.244 Although some regions 
may avoid takings challenges in the future through the use of rolling ease-
ments,245 regions that embrace alternative approaches may not be so lucky.246 
                                                                                                                           
dence); Eagle, supra note 1, at 760 (stating that new regulations are needed and will challenge 
traditional understandings of property rights); F. Patrick Hubbard, Palazzolo, Lucas, and Penn 
Central: The Need for Pragmatism, Symbolism, and Ad Hoc Balancing, 80 NEB. L. REV. 465, 478 
(2001) (observing that regulators will face severe challenges due to uncertainty). 
 236 See Hubbard, supra note 235, at 477 (discussing the challenges faced by lower courts). 
 237 Id. 
 238 Id. 
 239 Id. 
 240 Compare Rith Energy, Inc. v. United States, 270 F.3d 1347, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (em-
phasizing the importance of the purpose of the regulation in takings analysis), with Comm. for 
Reasonable Regulation of Lake Tahoe v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 311 F. Supp. 2d 972, 997 
(D. Nev. 2004) (focusing solely on the physical nature of the regulation). 
 241 See Palazzolo II, 533 U.S. 606, 634 (2001) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (emphasizing the 
importance of the regulation’s purpose in the Character Prong); Eagle, supra note 1, at 760 (noting 
the need for clarification of the Character Prong). 
 242 Compare Palazzolo II, 533 U.S. at 634 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (emphasizing the im-
portance of the regulation’s purpose in the Character Prong), with Comm. for Reasonable Regula-
tion of Lake Tahoe, 311 F. Supp. 2d at 997 (focusing solely on the physical nature of the regula-
tion); see Eagle, supra note 1, at 760 (noting the need for clarification of the Character Prong). 
 243 See Eagle, supra note 1, at 760 (noting that new forms of regulations will be needed to 
combat global warming and rising sea levels). 
 244 See id. (observing the potential for novel claims of regulatory takings from new regula-
tions). 
 245 See LAND USE LAW CTR., supra note 49, at 48. Because rolling easements are considered 
to be strongly rooted in the background principles of the common law and in particular, the public 
trust doctrine, rolling easements tend to be shielded from takings challenges because “articulating 
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It is, therefore, imperative that courts understand what the Character Prong 
means and what the proper balancing test entails in order to perform the 
appropriate analysis and process the possible abundance of future takings 
cases.247 Employing the same analytical approach—ideally employing Jus-
tice O’Connor’s approach—in all future non-categorical takings cases will 
encourage uniformity in takings jurisprudence.248 
Not only will there be an influx of takings challenges in the near future, 
but the challenges will likely involve many different types of regulations.249 
Because the impact of sea level rise will vary greatly across coastal regions, 
the corresponding regulations will vary, as well.250 Courts will need a clear 
test to use in evaluating takings claims concerning such diverse new regula-
tions.251 The diversity of future regulation provides an additional reason why 
uniformity in takings law is extremely critical at this juncture.252 Recognition 
and use by the Supreme Court of Justice O’Connor’s approach are integral in 
order to streamline non-categorical regulatory takings case law. 253  Justice 
                                                                                                                           
such background principles does not change the existence of fundamental property rights enjoyed 
by a private owner but merely clarifies that owner’s existing rights.” Id. If the private owner did 
not possess the right in the first place, no taking occurred. Id. Rolling easements provide an alter-
native to prohibiting development, which may in fact be unconstitutional. Id. 
 246 See Eagle, supra note 1, at 760 (observing the potential for novel claims of regulatory 
takings from new regulations). 
 247 See First English Evangelical I, 482 U.S. 304, 340 n.17 (1987) (Stevens, J., dissenting) 
(stating that regulators will be slow to act in the face of uncertain regulatory takings jurispru-
dence); Eagle, supra note 1, at 760 (observing the potential for novel claims of regulatory takings 
from new regulations); Hubbard, supra note 234, at 477 (discussing lower courts’ need for clarifi-
cation concerning the three Penn Central prongs). 
 248 See Palazzolo II, 533 U.S. 606, 634 (2001) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (emphasizing the 
importance of the regulation’s purpose in the Character Prong); Eagle, supra note 1, at 760 (noting 
the need for clarification of the Character Prong). 
 249 See Eagle, supra note 1, at 760 (stating that regulations are needed to address economic, 
environmental, and human risks resulting from sea level rise). 
 250 See LAUSCHE, supra note 3, at 5 (observing that sea level impacts will vary widely across 
regions); Eagle, supra note 1, at 760 (noting that novel regulations will arise in the face of sea 
level rise). 
 251 First English Evangelical I, 482 U.S. at 340 n.17 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (stating that 
regulators will be slow to act in the face of uncertain regulatory takings jurisprudence); Eagle, 
supra note 1, at 760 (stating that new regulations are needed and will challenge traditional under-
standings of property rights); Hubbard, supra note 234, at 477 (discussing the challenges faced by 
lower courts). 
 252 See First English Evangelical I, 482 U.S. at 340 n.17 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (stating that 
regulators will be slow to act in the face of uncertain regulatory takings jurisprudence); Eagle, 
supra note 1, at 760 (stating that new regulations are needed and will challenge traditional under-
standings of property rights); Hubbard, supra note 234, at 477 (discussing the challenges faced by 
lower courts); Lewyn, supra note 70, at 600 (noting the confusion among lower courts in takings 
clause jurisprudence). 
 253 See Palazzolo II, 533 U.S at 634 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (emphasizing the importance 
of the regulation’s purpose in evaluating the Character Prong); Eagle, supra note 1, at 760 (noting 
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O’Connor’s analysis opens the door to rationality and should serve as the 
standard for evaluating non-categorical regulatory takings claims.254 Now, in 
light of climate change and rising sea levels, regulatory takings case law de-
mands uniformity more than ever.255 
B. Justice O’Connor’s Test Is Practical and Suited for Novel Environmental 
Regulations 
The description of the Character Prong articulated by the Supreme 
Court in Penn Central is unworkable in the modern day.256 The Court stated 
that a taking is more readily found “when the interference with property can 
be characterized as a physical invasion by government . . . than when inter-
ference arises from some public program adjusting the benefits and burdens 
of economic life to promote the common good.”257 This characterization is 
problematic because potential environmental regulations could be charac-
terized as physical takings and also as public programs that promote the 
common good.258 Courts lack guidance when such scenarios arise.259 As a 
result, it is clear that the Supreme Court’s 1978 definition of the Character 
Prong is antiquated.260 This analysis is unsustainable in the face of future 
environmental regulation concerning not only sea level rise, but also cli-
mate change generally.261 Justice O’Connor’s test, on the other hand, pro-
                                                                                                                           
the need for clarification of the Character Prong); Echeverria, supra note 145, at 172, 177 (noting 
that the biggest need in this area of the law is resolving the Penn Central factors). 
 254 See First English Evangelical I, 482 U.S. at 340 n.17 (Stevens, J., dissenting); Eagle, su-
pra note 1, at 760. 
 255 See Palazzolo II, 533 U.S. at 634 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (emphasizing the importance 
of the regulation’s purpose in the Character Prong); Eagle, supra note 1, at 760 (discussing pend-
ing regulation in light of climate change and rising sea levels); Echeverria, supra note 145, at 172, 
177 (observing that the biggest need in this area of the law is resolving the Penn Central factors). 
 256 See Penn Cent. III, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978) (discussing the Character Prong in the con-
text of a physical invasion); Eagle, supra note 1, at 760 (stating that traditional law is ill-equipped 
to deal with upcoming regulations); Nolon, supra note 39, at 4 (noting that sea level rise regula-
tions frustrate the application of traditional environmental regulations). 
 257 Penn Cent. III, 438 U.S. at 124. 
 258 See Eagle, supra note 1, at 760 (stating that new regulations will not fit squarely into tradi-
tional notions of private property rights). 
 259 Id. (stating that new regulations are needed and will challenge traditional understandings 
of property rights); Hubbard, supra note 234, at 477 (discussing the challenges faced by lower 
courts); Lewyn, supra note 70, at 600 (noting the confusion among lower courts in takings clause 
jurisprudence). 
 260 See Penn Cent. III, 438 U.S. at 124 (discussing the Character Prong in the context of a 
physical invasion); Eagle, supra note 1, at 760 (stating that new regulations will not fit squarely 
into traditional notions of private property rights); Nolon, supra note 39, at 4 (noting that sea level 
rise regulations frustrate the application of traditional environmental law). 
 261 See Eagle, supra note 1, at 760 (stating that new regulations will not fit squarely into tradi-
tional notions of private property rights); Nolon, supra note 39, at 4 (noting that sea level rise 
regulations frustrate the application of traditional environmental law). 
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vides a workable and realistic analysis that can effectively handle future 
takings challenges.262 
Environmental law and the structure of the U.S. government “create 
well-known challenges for effective regulation, and climate change is likely 
to exacerbate those challenges.”263 Environmental law may even lack the 
capacity to respond to challenges presented by climate change.264 This is 
particularly relevant to sea level rise, which requires some form of adaptive 
management and the ability to swiftly react to changes.265 Similarly, courts 
need a legal framework that allows them to adjudicate takings claims brought 
against novel regulations created to combat sea level rise, which will cer-
tainly vary greatly across regions.266 Courts need guidance in the area of 
takings law and a clear partial takings test that allows them to give signifi-
cant weight to the important public purposes served by these diverse and 
intrusive regulations.267 
Requiring setbacks, the use of perimeter wall foundations, and prohib-
iting construction, expansion, and development are all forthcoming intru-
sive regulations that will ignite takings challenges.268 The severe threats 
posed by sea level rise will require new kinds of land-use regulation, which 
will severely strain traditional property rights. 269  Takings challenges to 
these new regulations will pose puzzling questions of traditional private 
property rights “under unprecedented climatic conditions.” 270  Any ap-
proach, other than an adaptive one, will lead to government inaction in an 
                                                                                                                           
 262 See Palazzolo II, 533 U.S. 606, 634 (2001) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (emphasizing the 
importance of a regulation’s purpose in takings analysis); Eagle, supra note 1, at 760 (articulating 
the need for a workable test outside the traditional legal framework); infra notes 263−273 and 
accompanying text. 
 263 Matthew D. Zinn, Adapting to Climate Change: Environmental Law in a Warmer World, 
34 ECOLOGY L.Q. 61, 82 (2007). 
 264 Id. 
 265 Craig, supra note 6, at 525. 
 266 See Eagle, supra note 1, at 760 (stating that new regulations will not fit squarely into tradi-
tional notions of private property rights); LAUSCHE, supra note 3, at 5 (noting that sea level rise 
varies across regions); Nolon, supra note 39, at 4 (noting that sea level rise regulations frustrate 
the application of traditional environmental law). 
 267 See Palazzolo II, 533 U.S. at 634 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (emphasizing the importance 
of a regulation’s purpose in takings analysis); Eagle, supra note 1, at 760 (noting that regulations 
serve a critical purpose in the face of severe threats from climate change and rising seas). 
 268 See CODIGA ET AL., supra note 2, at 2 (discussing regulatory solutions to sea level rise); 
ENVTL. RES. MGMT., supra note 50, at 14 (discussing regulatory solutions to sea level rise); Eagle, 
supra note 1, at 760 (discussing novel claims likely to arise). 
 269 See CODIGA ET AL., supra note 2, at 2 (discussing regulatory solutions to sea level rise); 
ENVTL. RES. MGMT., supra note 50, at 14 (discussing regulatory solutions to sea level rise); Eagle, 
supra note 1, at 760 (discussing novel claims likely to arise). 
 270 Eagle, supra note 1, at 760. 
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area that requires diligent acts and regulation.271 Sea level rise will dictate 
the need for a new paradigm in the development of coastal lands and regu-
latory and legal adjustments to accommodate these changes.272 Given these 
needs, Justice O’Connor’s test, which focuses on regulatory purposes, is 
adaptive and provides a legal framework in which courts can effectively 
adjudicate takings challenges concerning new environmental regulations.273 
C. Justice O’Connor’s Test Would Ensure Deference to Critical 
Environmental Regulations 
Agencies are actively investigating the implications of takings law on 
sea level rise planning.274 A number of agencies have come together and 
undertaken a project to address concerns over challenges posed by the cur-
rent takings law.275 The project aims to quell the fears surrounding takings 
law “through (1) legal analysis of existing takings jurisprudence and laws, 
(2) development of legal arguments that consider the imperative of sea-level 
rise, and (3) identification and development of specific, innovative land-use 
policies designed to withstand takings claims.” 276  Embodying Justice 
O’Connor’s approach will quell these fears and concerns because all inquir-
ies will focus on the purposes served by regulation, and the regulation of 
sea level rise serves a vital public purpose.277 Regulators have been called 
upon to ensure that new local land regulations tied to sea rise conform to an 
overall land-use plan, by maintaining specific and targeted purposes that 
serve a larger objective.278 According to the agencies’ report, a regulation 
that unambiguously furthers an objective of the comprehensive local plan 
has a much better chance of surviving a regulatory takings challenge.279 
                                                                                                                           
 271 See Craig, supra note 6, at 525 (stating that sea level rise will require adaptive manage-
ment). 
 272 See Nolon, supra note 39, at 4 (discussing the need for significant adjustments in law and 
legal practice to accommodate changing coastal development). 
 273 See Palazzolo II, 533 U.S. 606, 634 (2001) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (emphasizing the 
importance of a regulation’s purpose in takings analysis); Eagle, supra note 1, at 760 (discussing 
the need for new approaches in takings jurisprudence to deal with novel regulations from climate 
change). 
 274 See FLA. DEP’T OF ECON. OPPORTUNITY, supra note 38, at 92. 
 275 See id. (listing the fears that must be addressed regarding takings law). 
 276 Id. 
 277 See Palazzolo II, 533 U.S. at 634 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (emphasizing the importance 
of a regulation’s purpose in takings analysis); FLA. DEP’T OF ECON. OPPORTUNITY, supra note 38, 
at 92 (listing states’ fears regarding takings law and sea level rise planning); Eagle, supra note 1, 
at 760 (discussing the dangers posed by sea level rise and need for regulatory planning). 
 278 See LAND USE LAW CTR., supra note 49, at 93 (proposing uniform regulatory responses in 
line with public purpose). 
 279 Id. 
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Courts routinely recognize regulations that protect health, safety, and 
public welfare as ones that serve legitimate public purposes.280 Environ-
mental purposes, such as protecting coastlines, are equally important, and 
thus deserve great deference and should be weighed heavily against envi-
ronmental acts’ effects on private property.281 There should be a heavy pre-
sumption in favor of the government that its environmental regulations 
serve an important purpose and thus do not constitute regulatory takings.282 
Justice O’Connor’s approach will lend itself to this presumption, because an 
act’s widespread and significant environmental purposes will routinely out-
weigh the act’s effects.283 
Future regulatory action related to climate change will easily sustain 
takings challenges if Justice O’Connor’s analysis is applied. 284  Because 
regulations related to sea level rise serve important public purposes—such 
as setbacks that significantly reduce the risk of hazards from inundations—
they will likely survive takings challenges in light of the fact that Justice 
O’Connor approach focuses on examining the purposes served by regula-
tions.285 
Although some fear the prospect of increased litigation as a result of cli-
mate change-related environmental regulation and expect that the uncertainties 
surrounding takings law will exacerbate the claims, Justice O’Connor’s ap-
proach may actually have the opposite effect. 286 Widespread recognition 
                                                                                                                           
 280 See Rith Energy, Inc. v. United States, 270 F.3d 1347, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (recognizing 
the regulation’s purpose of protecting the public health, safety, and welfare); Brace v. United 
States, 72 Fed. Cl. 337, 355−56 (2006) (stating that the wetlands regulation indisputably serves an 
important purpose by protecting public welfare). 
 281 See Rith Energy, Inc., 270 F.3d at 1352 (recognizing the regulation’s purpose of protecting 
the public health, safety and welfare); Brace, 72 Fed. Cl. at 355−56 (stating that the wetlands 
regulation indisputably serves an important purpose by protecting public welfare); Eagle, supra 
note 1, at 760 (warning of the threats from rising coastlines including severe economic, environ-
mental, and human impacts). 
 282 See Rith Energy, Inc., 270 F.3d at 1352 (recognizing the regulation’s purpose of protecting 
the public health, safety, and welfare); Brace, 72 Fed. Cl. at 355−56 (stating that the wetlands 
regulation indisputably serves an important purpose by protecting public welfare); Eagle, supra 
note 1, at 760 (warning of the threats from rising coastlines including severe economic, environ-
mental, and human impacts). 
 283 See Palazzolo II, 533 U.S. 606, 634 (2001) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (noting the im-
portance of weighing an act’s purpose against its effects); Eagle, supra note 1, at 751, 760 (stating 
that property rights might be subordinate to property rights in light of severe threats). 
 284 See Palazzolo II, 533 U.S. at 634 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (noting the importance of 
weighing an act’s purpose against its effects); Eagle, supra note 1, at 751, 760 (stating that proper-
ty rights might be subordinate to property rights in light of severe threats). 
 285 See Palazzolo II, 533 U.S. at 634 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (noting the importance of 
weighing an act’s purpose against its effects); CODIGA ET AL., supra note 2, at 3 (discussing bene-
fits of setbacks); Eagle, supra note 1, at 751, 760 (stating that property rights might be subordinate 
to property rights in light of severe threats). 
 286 See Palazzolo II, 533 U.S. at 634 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (emphasizing the importance 
of a regulation’s purpose in takings analysis); Eagle, supra note 1, at 760 (noting threats to the 
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that regulatory acts, which possess strong public purposes, are likely to sur-
vive regulatory takings challenges may discourage potential plaintiffs from 
bringing such suits.287 The United States is likely to face an increase in reg-
ulation due to impending environmental changes, but by employing Justice 
O’Connor’s approach, courts may see a decrease of litigation in this area of 
the law.288 
CONCLUSION 
Determining what constitutes an unconstitutional regulatory taking is 
an extremely important and difficult role bestowed upon American courts. 
By promulgating Justice Sandra Day O’Connor’s analysis in Palazzolo v. 
Rhode Island of Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York’s 
third prong, the United States Supreme Court can reduce the complexity of 
such determinations as well as the confusion surrounding regulatory takings 
cases. Justice O’Connor’s approach is well suited to handle future environ-
mental regulations aimed at protecting coastal regions from rising sea lev-
els. In addition, her approach is more practical than the outdated method of 
comparing each regulation to a physical invasion. Her approach allows for 
deference to be given to critical environmental regulations in light of their 
important purposes. Although some courts have stated that the economic 
impact of the regulation on the claimant is the most important prong of the 
Penn Central test, the character of the governmental act prong has recently 
been viewed as the most important. Forthcoming cases and impending cli-
mate change regulations mandate that the character of the governmental act 
be considered more significant. This strand of case law is in dire need of 
clarification and direction from the Supreme Court, especially in light of 
looming climate change related regulation. Regulators must not be deterred 
from promulgating environmental regulations at such a critical time simply 
because they fear facing continuous takings challenges. 
                                                                                                                           
public from rising sea levels and the potential for novel claims in light of climate change regula-
tion); Lewyn, supra note 70, at 600 (noting the confusion among lower courts in takings clause 
jurisprudence). 
 287 See Palazzolo II, 533 U.S. at 634 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (emphasizing the importance 
of a regulation’s purpose in takings analysis); Eagle, supra note 1, at 760 (noting the important 
purpose of regulations in addressing threats posed by rising sea levels). 
 288 See Palazzolo II, 533 U.S. at 634 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (emphasizing the importance 
of a regulation’s purpose in takings analysis); Eagle, supra note 1, at 760 (noting the important 
purpose of regulations in addressing threats posed by rising sea levels and potential for claims). 
